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Abstract: Physicalism demands an explication of what it means for
something to be physical. But the most popular way of providing
one—viz., characterizing the physical in terms of the postulates of a
scientifically derived physical theory—is met with serious trouble.
Proponents of physicalism can either appeal to current physical theory or to some future physical theory (preferably an ideal and complete one). Neither option is promising: currentism almost assuredly
renders physicalism false and futurism appears to render it indeterminate or trivial. The purpose of this essay is to argue that attempts
to characterize the mental encounter a similar dilemma: currentism
with respect to the mental is likely to be inadequate or contain falsehoods and futurism leaves too many significant questions about the
nature of mentality unanswered. This new dilemma, we show, threatens both sides of the current debate surrounding the metaphysical
status of the mind.
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1. Introduction
Physicalism faces what is known as “Hempel’s Dilemma.” 1 This dilemma
emerges in an attempt to answer the question of how we are to characterize
the physical. Not to put too fine a point on it, we can either choose to
characterize it in terms of some current theory or some future theory. Those
who support the second option typically appeal to a complete and ideal
future theory. Neither option seems particularly promising: Choosing current physical theory would almost assuredly make physicalism false or incoherent, 2 and choosing a future theory would seem to render physicalism
indeterminate or perhaps trivial. 3
The purpose of this essay is to argue that a similar dilemma threatens
any (non-eliminativist) approach to the mental that attempts to answer
significant metaphysical questions about the status of the mind. The idea
itself is fairly straightforward: Currentism with respect to the mental is
likely to lead to false claims and futurism leaves too many questions unanswered. Insofar as a metaphysical position takes the content of “mental” as
either settled or unproblematic, it will falter against the Scylla and Charybdis of this dilemma. The dilemma thus threatens the foundations of the
current debate surrounding the metaphysical status of the mind.
1
Hempel (1969; 1980), but see also Chomsky (2000), Crane and Mellor (1990),
and Melnyk (1997).
2
If “physical” means the posits of current physics, then physicalism—the view
that holds that everything that exists is physical—is false because the inventory of
current physics is incomplete. In addition, if understood in terms of current physics,
physicalism is likely incoherent because of the existing inconsistencies between the
subfields of physics (Wilson 2006)
3
We do not know what such a future theory would look like, nor do we know
whether it will end up positing mental entities as fundamental. The fact that it is
not possible to determine which of these options—indeterminancy or triviality—will
obtain just further highlights the epistemic challenges facing those who embrace the
second horn of the dilemma.
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We want to be absolutely clear about what is, and is not, on offer. The
dilemma provides neither a positive argument for physicalism nor a refutation of anti-physicalism. The challenge posed by the existence of phenomenal consciousness to physicalist attempts to understand our place in the
world does not magically disappear by acknowledging the difficulties that
characterizations of the mental face. What the dilemma does is to expose
an important blind spot shared by many standard positions in the philosophical discussion of the metaphysical status of the mental. Many participants in this discussion acknowledge the need for precision and nuance when
it comes to articulating the ways in which the mental could be related to
the physical. It is precisely due to such a concerted and sustained effort to
better understand the relationship between the mental and the physical
that the literature has been populated by attempts to describe and refine
the notions of identity, reduction, supervenience, realization, emergence,
and grounding and apply them to the mind-body problem. 4 Furthermore,
both proponents and critics of physicalism have rightly paid much attention
to the nature of the physical, asking what it is and how it can be defined. 5
Unfortunately, however, the very same participants often fail to apply the
same kind of rigor and questioning attitude when it comes to the nature of
the mental as it figures in the mind-body (or brain) problem. Instead, they
typically appeal to intuitive, rough-and-ready characterizations of the mental (qua mental phenomenon) that are thought to suffice for the purposes
of examining the metaphysical status of mentality.
There are prima facie reasons to question the adequacy of such characterizations. Consider the case of vitalism. Historically, the phenomenon of
life was thought to provide a clear exception to materialism. One factor
contributing to vitalism’s demise was the inability of its supporters to settle
on a precise characterization of vital forces (Mayr 1982). The comparison
between consciousness and life has on occasion been dismissed as little more
The literature is too expansive to review here. For recent surveys, see Elpidorou
(2017), Stoljar (2015), and Tiehen (2018).
5
See, e.g., Bokulich (2011); Dove (2016); Dowell (2006); Melnyk (1997) and
(2003); Montero (2001) and (2009); Montero and Papineau (2005); Ney (2008); Spurrett and Papineau (1999); Stoljar (2001); Tiehen (2016); Vicente (2011); Wilson
(2006); Witmer (2016); and Worley (2006).
4
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than a weak argument from analogy (e.g., Chalmers 2003). However, the
overall success of physicalist explanations of phenomena that were previously thought to be exceptions to physicalism (Melnyk 2003) and the apparent causal closure of the physical (Papineau 2001) suggest that a more
robust account of the mental might be required, just as a richer account of
life was required. To put the same point somewhat differently, we need to
have reasons that are not shaped by retrospective bias to think that our
ideas about the nature of the mental are more solid than our past ideas
about life. In the absence of such reasons, the rich, robust, and diverse
circumstantial case for physicalism weighs heavily and forces us to take
seriously the idea that there might be more to the mental than what our
intuitive characterizations of it reveal.
Our aim in this paper is to demonstrate why an appeal to an intuitive,
pre-theoretical notion of the mental is insufficient for the purposes of investigating the ontological status of the mental and specifically, of consciousness. Although a comparison between vitalism and physicalism (or between
the concept of life and the concept of mental) is suggestive, our case does
not rest on that comparison. In fact, we will show that there are reasons
internal to the debate pertaining to the ontological status of consciousness
that support the need for a rich account of the mental. Because of that,
characterizations of the mental—just like those of the physical—face
a choice between currentism or futurism.
There has been remarkable progress in both scientific and philosophical
investigations of the nature of mentality. Precisely because of such progress,
the nature of mentality cannot be assumed to be an unproblematic given.
Indeed, we have not reached a settled understanding of the mental yet, nor
do we know enough to predict confidently how future theories will describe
the mental. But if the meaning of “mental” as this figures in the mind-body
problem is unclear, not fully understood, or subject to revision and change,
as we will argue that it is, then claims about the relationship between the
mental to the physical would also be unclear, not fully understood, or subject to revision and change. According to our view, progress in resolving the
mind-body problem is unlikely to take place without first acknowledging
that we have only a limited grasp of the nature of mentality.
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2. Why is this a New Dilemma?
Given that our dilemma mirrors Hempel’s Dilemma to some degree, one
might wonder why there has been almost no discussion of it to date. 6 One
reason may be the perception that anti-physicalism and non-physicalist
views just do not face the same sort of questions as physicalism. Giving
voice to this perception, Levine and Trogdon (2009, 356) write:
A longstanding issue in the philosophy of mind is how to specify
the sense of “physical” at issue with materialism. There is no
corresponding problem, however, for specifying mentality; mental
properties are either conscious properties or intentional properties.

We do not take Levine and Trogdon’s remark as proof that there is an
agreed-upon characterization of the mental. What the quoted passage suggests instead is that, compared to the task of articulating the physical,
describing the mental is an easier task. In the case of the mental, we have
some grasp of the essence of mentality: whatever the mental is, it is either
the phenomenal or the intentional, or both. Such an understanding of the
mental can then serve as our starting point in sketching out the various
positions in the debate surrounding the ontological status of the mind and
its relationship to the brain, body, and world.
As a matter of actual philosophical practice, there appears to be little
disagreement concerning how to broadly define the mental. Although we do
not quarrel with the cultural or sociological significance of this claim, we do
challenge the notion that such general agreement regarding the mental settles anything. Consider, for example, what would happen if all the philosophers who support physicalism got together and agreed once and for all
that the physical should be defined in terms of a commitment to Cartesian
corpuscles. Ex hypothesis there would be no disagreement concerning how
to characterize the physical. But this would not in any way remove the
The only explicit discussion of this new dilemma that we have found is in (Gillett
and Witmer 2001). Tellingly, they dismiss it straight away. They contend that our
special epistemic access to mental entities blocks the dilemma. See section 3 below
for a discussion of this approach.
6
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challenge posed by Hempel’s Dilemma, which has nothing to do with philosophical agreement and everything to do with accuracy and truth.
Reflecting a kind of philosophical common sense (at least within analytic
philosophy), Levine and Trogdon offer a disjunctive characterization of the
mental, defining it in terms of either conscious or intentional properties.
Because conscious properties are central to so many of the important debates concerning the mental and the physical, we are going to focus on them
exclusively in this essay. However, the same arguments that we employ with
respect to characterizing the mental in terms of conscious properties can be
employed mutatis mutandis to attempts to define it in terms of intentionality. 7 When we turn to questions concerning the nature of conscious properties, we find that there is a great deal of disagreement concerning how to
define them. In other words, all that is accomplished by the disjunctive
characterization offered above is that it pushes the problem down a level.
Or so we will argue in section 3.
An additional reason for the lack of consideration of our proposed dilemma is that claims about the mental play a different role in the debate
over physicalism than our claims about the physical. At a minimum, physicalism rests on the universally quantified claim that all relevant phenomena, including those that we identify as mental, are ultimately physical.
Under the typical rough-and-ready formulation, physicalism holds that
there is nothing over and above the physical. Hempel’s concerns our purported inability to arrive at a characterization of the physical that is able
to support this universal claim. In particular, supporters of the dilemma
focus on our inability to rule out fundamental mental properties, entities,
events, etc. that would seem to violate physicalism. Given this, a strictly
analogous dilemma would apply to idealism or what might be called mentalism (the claim that there is nothing over and above the mental). Of
course, contemporary adherents of this sort of metaphysical position are
hard to find. Instead, anti-physicalists tend to defend the existentially quantified claim that particular mental properties, entities, events, etc. are ultimately not physical ones. Thus, if our dilemma is to be relevant to contemporary debates, it needs to undermine our confidence in our ability to
Indeed, we suggest that it will likely be easier to make the case with respect to
intentional properties because their theoretical nature is more apparent.
7
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characterize mental phenomena in such a way that confirms or disconfirms
this more circumscribed metaphysical thesis. In keeping with this, we endeavor to show that our dilemma does indeed undermine confidence in such
claims. We argue that neither our current understanding of the mental nor
our projectible future understanding is up to the job of settling such metaphysical questions.
The lack of discussion of our proposed dilemma could also be due to the
fact that it is a late entry into a crowded field. We already know that the
mental presents special philosophical challenges. After all, there is an extensive literature on a number of well-established problems concerning the
mental–including the relationship, causal or otherwise, between the mind
and body (Jackson 1982; Chalmers 1996; Kim 1998; Libet 1985; Robb and
Heil 2013), the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1996), the
knowledge argument (Jackson 1982, 1986), and the explanatory gap (Levine
1983; Nagel 1974). Do we really need a new problem concerning the mental?
We think that we do. One of the reasons that we think this is that the
problem identified in this essay is very different than the other better-known
problems. Indeed, it creates conceptual challenges for most of the currently
identified problems because they generally view the mental as a serious
threat to physicalism or, more broadly, naturalism. Following Jackson
(1998), we can categorize most of the traditional puzzles as “location problems” where the core issues are concerned with how to place mental entities
or properties in a physical or natural world. These problems generally depend on accepting certain positive claims about the nature of the mental.
The new dilemma—which we will heretofore refer to as “DaM” for Dilemma
about the Mental—seems to make both the formulation and solution of
location problems harder.
Lastly, one might think that DaM does not apply to the mental because
of the general perception that the sources of Hempel’s original dilemma are
the very features of physicalism that supporters of alternative metaphysical
accounts of the mental oppose, such as commitments to metaphysical naturalism, reductionism about the mental, 8 and perhaps some variety of

Here we are treating reductionism as the position that holds that the mental is
nothing over and above the physical.
8
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scientism. 9 Because many metaphysical stances on the mental involve an
explicit disavowal of these features, 10 it is not surprising that their supporters would not worry about an analogous dilemma. 11 We suggest that this
perception is mistaken. Hempel’s Dilemma primarily arises from two related
elements. The first is a set of reasons to think that our current understanding
of the physical is incomplete or inadequate. Certainly the fact that, taken as
a whole, contemporary physics is inconsistent counts as a red flag (Wilson
2006). The second is a set of reasons to think that our future understanding
will be theoretically transformative in ways that are difficult to appreciate
from our current epistemic standpoint. A history consisting of profound
theoretical upheavals with respect to our conception of the physical provides
an inductive case for the likelihood of radical future theoretical innovation.
We propose that analogs of these two elements—neither of which requires
a commitment to naturalism, reductionism, or scientism—are present with
respect to the mental. We take our current understanding of the mental to
be, at the very least, significantly incomplete or inadequate. And we believe
that a future understanding of the mental is likely to be theoretically transformative. Consider, for example, what the possibilities of conscious AI, teleportation, or brain-to-brain communication could teach us about the mind.

3. Troubles with currentism
In this section, we set out to accomplish two things. First, we argue
that there is actually substantial disagreement concerning the nature of

9
The term scienticism is often used with a negative connotation. However, there
has been a recent effort to reclaim the positive sense of this term (e.g., Ladyman and
Ross 2007) in much the same way that some philosophers of mind have sought to
reclaim the positive sense of reductionism (e.g., Churchland and Churchland 1992).
10
It is important to recognize that this characterization is not universal. For
example, Chalmers (1996, 128) defends a form of dualism that “…is naturalistic because it posits that everything is a consequence of a network of basic properties and
laws.”
11
Physicalists, on the contrary, are not particularly focused on finding new problems concerning the mental.
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conscious properties. Second, we contend that this disagreement throws
currentism into question.

3.1. Historical precursors
Before we get to our argument, we want to acknowledge that our focus
on the question of how to characterize conscious properties is not without
precedent. We are not the first to highlight the philosophical importance of
this issue. Consider a well-known anecdote concerning a public interaction
between the philosophers Herbert Feigl and Rudolph Carnap (we are relying
on Tim Crane’s 2007 recounting of this event). In the course of a talk defending physicalism at UCLA, Feigl admitted that science had yet to provide
a physical explanation of the qualia associated with phenomenal experience.
Carnap, who was is in the audience, purportedly interrupted Feigl, and the
following exchange is supposed to have happened (Crane 2007, 16-17):
Carnap:

But Feigl, there is something missing from your lecture. Science
is beginning to explain qualia in terms of the alpha factor!
Feigl:
Carnap, please tell me: What is the alpha factor?
Carnap: Well, Feigl if you tell me what qualia are, I’ll tell you what
the alpha factor is.

Whether or not this conversation actually occurred in this manner, we agree
with Crane that the point about qualia is well taken. 12 Too many philosophical discussions about consciousness in general and phenomenal
conscious properties in particular rest on the implicit assumption that these
phenomena are well understood.
Carnap’s rejoinder fits with the general positivist emphasis on the need
for philosophers to clearly define their terms, preferably in a way that
meshes with the physical sciences. We raise the question of how to characterize conscious properties for different reasons than Carnap: we are not
positivists, we are not defending physicalism, and we are not dismissing the
In another article, Crane (2001, 170) laments: “To have a clear understanding of
this problem, we have to have a clear understanding of the notion of qualia. But
despite the centrality, it seems to me that there is not a clear consensus about how
the term ‘qualia’ should be understood, and to this extent the contemporary problem
of consciousness is not well-posed.”
12
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relevance of conscious properties. We don’t even fully agree with Carnap
about the facts on the ground. In contrast to his assessment, we think that
philosophers have in fact tried to tell us what conscious properties are.
Indeed, a lot of work has been done on this topic in the intervening decades.
The trouble is that these philosophers often provide very different answers,
and their disagreement threatens the first horn of the dilemma.

3.2. The center will not hold
To date, we have found only one explicit discussion of something like
DaM: Gillett and Witmer (2001) acknowledge the prima facie plausibility
of such a dilemma but then argue that it is blocked by our special epistemic
access to mental entities. However, special epistemic access is not enough
to block DaM because even if we grant that such access exists this would
not guarantee that one possesses an adequate understanding of the mental.
This seems particularly true of consciousness itself, which of course lies at
the center of the disagreement over the status of mental entities. Chalmers
(1996, 3) himself notes that consciousness, “can be frustratingly diaphanous:
in talking about conscious experience, it is notoriously difficult to pin down
the subject matter.” Indeed, the claim that we have some kind of special or
privileged access to our mental states often reduces to one or both of the
following claims: (i) Mental states are self-luminous (if a subject is in mental
state M, then the subject knows that they are in M) and (ii) Mental states
are incorrigible (if a subject believes that they are in mental state M, then
they are in M). Neither claim suffices to show that we know the nature of
our mental states.
Even if one restricts the mental to (phenomenally) conscious properties,
our understanding depends upon our conceptualization of such properties.
What this shows is that what we take to be features of conscious properties
depends on the nature of our phenomenal concepts (i.e., the concepts that
we use when we introspectively examine the phenomenal character of our
experience). If the deployment of phenomenal concepts in introspection reveals to us the entire 13 nature of their referents, then currentism is safe. But
If phenomenal concepts reveal only part of the essence of their referents, then
we could still be mistaken about the nature of consciousness and qualia.
13
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why should one accept such a strong claim? The use of phenomenal concepts
may reveal only part of the essence of their referents, or it may only reveal
accidental features of their referents (ones that allow us to uniquely identify
them in the actual world), or it may fail to reveal any features at all. 14 If
any of these three possibilities could be true, then it would undermine currentism.
Moreover, there are very good reasons to be concerned about our current
understanding of conscious properties. Their precise nature has been—to
echo the quote from Chalmers given above—notoriously difficult to pin
down. Responding to the question of what qualia are, Block (1980, 278)
famously quipped “As Louis Armstrong said when asked what Jazz is, ‘If
you got to ask, you ain’t never gonna get to know’.” The trouble is that a
number of people have asked and, more importantly, given different answers. 15 Some categorically deny the existence of qualia at all (Dennett
1991). Others deny that qualia exist where one might think that they
should. For instance, Tye and Harman, utilizing the supposition that experiences are transparent or diaphanous, have claimed that qualia are not
properties of our visual experiences (e.g., Harman 1990; Tye 2000; cf.
Dretske 1995). 16 Some make the controversial claim that qualia are (or reduce to) the representational contents of our experiences (e.g., Dretske 1995;
Lycan 1996). Others hold instead that qualia are intrinsic, non-representational properties of our experiences (e.g, Block 1990; Peacocke 1983). Yet
others hold a relational (i.e., direct realist) account of qualia (e.g., Campbell
14
See Nida-Rümelin (2006) and Goff (2011) and critical discussions in Diaz-Leon
(2014), Elpidorou (2016) and Trogdon (2016).
15
Our discussion of qualia in this section follows that of Crane (2001). We recommend looking to his paper for a richer and more detailed discussion of the diversity of opinion that exists within the philosophical literature concerning this fundamental notion.
16
Tye (2017) explains: “[Q]ualia, conceived of as the immediately ‘felt’ qualities of
experiences of which we are cognizant when we attend to them introspectively, do
not really exist. The qualities of which we are aware are not qualities of experiences
at all, but rather qualities that, if they are qualities of anything, are qualities of
things in the world (as in the case of perceptual experiences) or of regions of our
bodies (as in the case of bodily sensations). This is not to say that experiences do
not have qualia. The point is that qualia are not qualities of experiences.”
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2002; Brewer 2011). Finally, there is even disagreement as to what organisms undergo states with qualia. Do insects, for instance, experience qualia?
The aforementioned disagreements are substantial. If we do not know
where on the phylogenetic scale qualia start to appear, then we do not have
a good understanding of the necessary biological conditions for their existence. If we do not know whether qualia should be individuated narrowly or
widely, then we do know what kind of contribution (causal or constitutional) the world makes. And, most importantly, if we cannot agree whether
qualia are properties of experiences or not, then it is unclear whether we
have really understood the notion of qualia.
But isn’t there something intuitively clear and distinctive about our conscious experiences (e.g., Chalmers 2010)? Don’t we know that in some sense
or another qualia must exist? Don’t we know what the redness of the setting
sun is? If so, isn’t that, admittedly minimal, and pre-theoretical understanding of qualia sufficient to furnish us with a satisfactory account of mentality?
The answer, we believe, is simply “No.” As noted by both Crane (2001) and
Keely (2009), many of the same claims that are made in support of qualia
were made about the currently disfavored notion of sense-data. For example,
Price in an article from 1932 (quoted by Crane 2001, 175) explains:
The term sense-datum is meant to be a neutral term … The term
is meant to stand for something whose existence is indubitable
(however fleeting) something from which all theories of perception ought to start.

Now the mere fact that many of the same, controversial claims made about
qualia were made about the earlier notion of sense-data does not in and of
itself show that the former are false, but it does suggest that more is needed
to settle the matter than a careful self-examination of our inner experience.
Furthermore, the minimal understanding of qualia that one is able to
find when one introspects on one’s experiences is insufficient to answer the
many questions that would allow us to expose the nature of qualia. Can
one, simply by focusing on the painfulness of pain or the redness of a Rothko
painting, settle whether qualia are properties of experiences or not? Can
they determine whether the environment or our bodies make a constitutive
contribution to the content of our experience? Can they tell whether it is a
possible for a physical and functional duplicate of an acrophobic subject to
Organon F 28 (4) 2021: 867–895
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fail to experience fear when they stand near the edge of a tall building? Can
they resolve the issue of whether qualia are physical or not? By itself, a
minimal, pre-theoretical understanding of qualia, if such a thing exists, cannot settle the nature of mentality. This is evident not only by the vast array
of diverging and in some cases contradicting accounts of qualia, all of which
seem to appeal to this pre-theoretical notion of qualia (see, e.g., Tye (2017)
for an overview), but also by the fact that attempts to specify further the
nature of qualia require substantial assumptions about the nature of introspection, awareness, representation, and concepts.
One could argue that our focus on qualia is somewhat dated. In other
words, one could possibly claim that our discussion of currentism is not
current enough. Current discussions of conscious properties—so the argument might go—are not as reliant on either the term or the concept of
qualia. We are willing to grant the possibility that such a shift might be
underway. One might even be able to find quantitative evidence for the
waning influence of the concept of qualia (tied perhaps to the decreased use
of this term). This, however, would not be enough to undermine our general
point. What needs to be shown to do this is that significant theoretical
disagreement about the precise nature of conscious properties does not exist.
We hold the line here and maintain that, if anything, the level of disagreement has increased. In fact, it seems likely that the very reason for the
emerging distaste for the term qualia (a distaste which is by no means universal) is a lack of agreement about the nature of qualia. Moreover, it is
hard not to see how this purported shift away from qualia is not grist for
our mill. After all, if the notion of qualia is currently falling out of favor the
way that sense-data fell out of favor decades ago, then we have some inductive reason to question our current understanding. Again, this is not an
argument that we will never arrive at a successful theory. More importantly,
it is not an attack on the effort to theorize about the nature of conscious
properties. Instead, it is merely pointing out there is reason to think that
our current understanding is not accurate or secure enough to settle important metaphysical questions.
We propose that the existence of significant disagreement about the very
nature of conscious properties impugns our current state of knowledge. This
is not a denial of the existence of conscious properties but rather an
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assessment of our current understanding of them. Despite appearances to the
contrary, our current understanding of mentality (at least as it is defined
relative to conscious properties) is far from complete and likely to be mistaken
in significant ways. Future developments in philosophy, biology, neuroscience, and psychology could render many of our beliefs about mentality
false. 17

4. The prospects of futurism
Above we argued that our current understanding of mentality leaves
much to be desired. Could one characterize the mental in terms of a final
and complete theory or account of the mental? Just as any meaningful form
of physicalism must avoid positing sui generis non-physical entities, any
meaningful and positive account of the character and ontology of the mental
must avoid a robust eliminativism in which the mental does not exist. We
believe that a futurist approach is fraught with difficulties. Our main contention is that, given our current epistemic standing in regard to mentality,
the shape of this final theory or account is severely and problematically (for
present purposes) indeterminate. This is due primarily to two facts. First,
there are a number of competing theories of the mental that might turn out
to be true. Second, most (if not all) of these possible final theories are radically transformative insofar as their success would require a substantial
revision of our current understanding of the mental. The question remains:
Does this revision amount to a wholesale rejection of the mental as it is
currently understood or not? We suggest that we do not know enough about
the future outcomes of our theories of mentality to be in a position to make
an informed judgment about their content.
Consider for instance the following possible final theories about the mental: emergentism, non-reductive physicalism (e.g., realization), neutral monism, property dualism, panpsychism, or something completely new and
Scientific discoveries, e.g., blindsight (Weiskrantz 1980) and the two visual streams hypothesis (Milner and Goodale 2006), and conceptual advances, e.g., the phenomenal/access consciousness distinction (Block 1995) have transformed our understanding of consciousness and thus of mentality.
17
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unknown. Obviously the last option is a non-starter as a means of avoiding
indeterminacy. But all the other ones are also problematic. Indeed, many
of the problems that beset a currentist attempt to define the mental also
beset these future theories. As we saw in the previous section, our current
understanding of conscious properties is at best incomplete. On the one
hand, there is significant disagreement about the nature of conscious properties, and on the other hand, any understanding of conscious properties
that can serve as the “common denominator” across different positions appears to be incapable of settling substantial questions about the character
of the mental. Consequently, any attempt to characterize the mental on the
basis of a future theory that utilizes our current understanding of qualia
would be problematic insofar as the content of such a future theory is (given
our current epistemic perspective) severely indeterminate. We just do not
know which of the many competing accounts of the mental we ought to
accept, and if we opt for a minimal (or “thin”) understanding of the mental,
then our future theory will fail to specify the ontological status of the mental. The point is simple: we don’t know enough about qualia right now to
be able to draw meaningful conclusions concerning how the notion of qualia
will be developed in the future.
Finally, it will not work to characterize the mental in terms of a final
theory but not specify whether that theory is, e.g., panpsychism, neutral
monism, or realization physicalism. Each of them tells us something radically different about the nature of mentality. Put crudely, the first holds
that the mental is fundamental, the second holds that fundamentally
nothing is mental, and the third holds that the mental exists but only
derivatively (it is nothing over and above the physical). The fact that some
of our candidates for a final theory of the mental are deeply at odds with
each other shows that before we can define the mental by using one of these
theories, we have to decide which one is likely to be true. But if philosophical
debates about the nature of consciousness are any indication, we are far
away from being able to do so. All in all, the prospects of futurism appear
to be rather dim.
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5. Objections and replies
We have argued that attempts to characterize the mental encounter
a dilemma similar to the one faced by physicalists in their efforts to define
the physical. Given our contemporary understanding of the mind—including all that we have gathered through our phenomenological experiences,
philosophical investigations, and the psychological and brain sciences—neither currentism nor futurism with respect to consciousness and other purportedly non-physical mental properties holds much promise. Recognizing
that DaM flies in the face of philosophical conventional wisdom and threatens to upend established philosophical debates concerning the relationship
of the mental to the physical, we review some possible objections and offer
responses below. The objections share a common theme: the idea that the
dilemma, for one reason or another, does not apply to the debate between
physicalists and anti-physicalists.
Before getting to these objections though, we want to emphasize what
we see as the fundamental force of the dilemma. We suggest that the dilemma throws into question our capacity to answer important metaphysical
questions surrounding consciousness and other mental phenomena given our
current knowledge. It thus decidedly does not amount to a defense of either
physicalism or anti-physicalism. What it does do is threaten the arguments
offered in support of either metaphysical position. In other words, we
acknowledge that identifying the dilemma does not make consciousness any
less mysterious or help us to see how it fits in our world. Indeed, the dilemma demonstrably adds to the mystery. After all, it demonstrates that
we know even less we thought we did about conscious properties. DaM in
no way forces us to deny the presence of the significant epistemic gap that
inspires most of the important philosophical puzzles. Having said this, we
need to also point out that DaM becomes an issue for specific formulations
of these puzzles. If it obtains, then our epistemic grip on the mental may
well be insufficient to affirm the possibility of inverted spectra or philosophical zombies, to arrive at an adequate understanding of the super-scientist
Mary, or to outline clearly the hard problem of consciousness. In other
words, DaM places pressure on so-called location problems by throwing into
question our understanding of what is being located.
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5.1. Objection #1
There is an important asymmetry between the roles that the terms
“physical” and “mental” (or “qualia”) play in our evaluation of physicalist
theories of mind. “Mental” refers to the properties, entities, events, etc. that
need to be explained whereas “physical” denotes the set of properties, entities, events, etc. that are meant to be doing the explaining. Because of the
role of “physical” we naturally need a precise account of it. However, because of the non-explanatory role of “mental” we do not need nearly as
much precision as we need with “physical.” All that we need is some rough
understanding of mentality—one that perhaps can be given ostensibly: mentality is THAT!
Reply: We suggest that this objection turns on a misunderstanding of
the force of the dilemma. To see why, consider the role that Hempel’s original dilemma plays in the debate. Few suggest that, because of the dilemma,
we should eliminate our everyday notion of physical properties, entities,
events, etc. More to the point, few suggest that we should stop doing physics
because of the dilemma. What people do suggest is that the dilemma shows
that we do not know enough about the ultimate nature of the physical to
answer important metaphysical questions—in particular, the question of
whether or not mental entities or properties are physical. In an analogous
fashion, this new dilemma should not be seen as an attack on our everyday
notion of the mental or indeed on our everyday conception of conscious
properties. 18 Nor should it be seen as attempt to preempt philosophical or
scientific investigation of these. As was the case with the original dilemma,
DaM threatens attempts to settle the relevant metaphysical questions by
an appeal to a substantial account of mentality.
Returning to the objection, we can make the issues raised by DaM explicit. We have no problem granting that there are everyday conceptions of
phenomenal experience or other mental phenomena that serve as a starting
point for philosophical investigation. These phenomena may well serve in
some sense as explananda for philosophical explanation (although we would
note that in most non-dogmatic areas of human investigation it is not
Of course, suggesting that there is an everyday notion of qualia is contentious to
say the least. This fact alone seems to offer support to our main position.
18
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uncommon to modify one’s understanding of what is to be explained in the
course of developing explanations). 19 We do not even question that they
may raise intriguing metaphysical location problems. We do suggest,
though, that accounts of such phenomena that are rich enough to address
the relevant metaphysical questions will need to offer a meaningful characterization of their mentality. As Robert van Gulick notes in his discussion
of the explanatory gap, “the more we can articulate the structure within
the phenomenal realm, the greater the chances for physical explanation;
without structure we have no place to attach our explanatory ‘hooks’”
(1997, 565). Thus, attempts to determine whether an aspect of our conscious
life can be explained in physical terms must begin with detailed descriptions
of that aspect. It is here that the dilemma becomes relevant, for as we
argued in section 3, our understanding of the mind appears to be both
incomplete and likely to be mistaken in significant ways. Importantly, this
problem arises independently of any understanding of the physical. For instance, it would arise within the context of a full-throated idealism where
everything that exists is mental.

5.2. Objection #2
Because anti-physicalism is defined in terms of its opposition to physicalism, it is not undermined by DaM.
Reply: We freely admit that DaM arises in the context of positive claims
about the nature of mentality. This raises the possibility that an anti-physicalism devoid of such claims could elude its reach. We suggest however
that it is very difficult to envision a substantial form of anti-physicalism
that is free of positive commitments concerning the character of the mental.
Given that many arguments for anti-physicalism depend crucially on observations concerning conscious experience and a number of philosophers of
science have questioned the very notion of theory-neutral observation

In the case of consciousness, P.S. Churchland (1986), P. M. Churchland (1995),
and Flanagan (1992), among others, have argued for a co-evolutionary approach to
the problem of consciousness: one that simultaneously examines the problem of consciousness both from the physical (biological, neuronal, or bodily) and the mental
(or phenomenal) perspective.
19
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(Azzouni 2004; Bogen 2016; Chang 2005; Duhem 1906; Hanson 1958; Kuhn
1962), it seems reasonable to suppose that theoretical influences—perhaps
implicit ones—may be at work. More importantly, as became apparent in
our discussion of the current debates surrounding qualia and consciousness,
there are substantial philosophical disagreements about fundamental aspects of mentality. Although these disagreements do not by themselves impugn any particular (anti-physicalist) account, they provide some reason to
doubt that we are dealing with straightforward ontological issues that can
be resolved by appealing to a body of evidence about which everyone agrees.
Furthermore, the debates tend to concern the very nature of the mental.
More often than not, they involve specific assertions about mental phenomena. Given this, a successful anti-physicalism likely needs to provide some
positive account of the mental, and this is precisely when the dilemma kicks
in.

5.3. Objection #3
DaM does not provide support for physicalism.
Reply: We agree. 20 That was never the point. Indeed, we would go further and claim that DaM creates problems for various forms of physicalism.
For instance, many won’t work as a means of avoiding DaM because we
still need to know what the mental entities are that supervene on, are realized by, or are grounded in the physical. Full-throated forms of eliminitivism (Churchland, 1981; Bickle, 2003) may avoid this problem, but such
views have their own challenges.
In addition, DaM undermines the popular strategy of defending physicalism by positing a No Fundamental Mentality constraint (Wilson 2006)
or equating the physical with the non-mental (Spurrett and Papineau 1999;
Montero 2009; Montero and Papineau 2005). Let’s consider the constraint
approach first. If we choose our current understanding of the mental, then
any No Fundamental Mentality constraint will be trivially true simply because our current understanding of the mental is likely to be false. If we
After all, physicalism still faces Hempel’s original dilemma. For discussion and
proposed solutions see Dove (2016); Elpidorou and Dove (2018); Hempel (1980); Ney
(2008); Prelevic (2017); and van Fraassen (2002).
20
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choose some future complete and ideal theory, then the proposed constraint
is going to be empty. Similar problems face the stratagem of equating the
physical with the non-mental. More generally, DaM further muddies the
water with respect to the question of whether or not a complete physics
contains fundamental mental entities.

5.4. Objection #4
Just as Hempel’s Dilemma turns on an appeal to theories of the physical,
DaM requires an appeal to theories of the mental. This is a problem for
DaM because we do not have—or need—analogous theories of the mental.
To the extent that a philosophical position avoids an appeal to theories of
the mental, it avoids the dilemma.
Reply: Not surprisingly, we think that it is harder to avoid theoretical
claims about the mental than this objection presupposes, but we maintain
that the objection fails even if we leave this presupposition unchallenged.
DaM concerns our lack of access to characterizations of the mental that are
rich enough to settle important metaphysical questions. Avoiding theories
of the mental does not get us out of this bind. We still have reason to think
that characterizations based on our current understanding of the mental
are insufficient and that we know too little about future characterizations
to draw significant conclusions. Indeed, the situation appears to be worse
than it is with regard to the physical. For instance, some supporters of
physicalism have argued that we know enough about current physics to be
confident that the posits of a complete and ideal future physical theory will
exclude irreducible mental entities (e.g., Bokulich 2011; for reviews see Dove
2016; Ney 2008; Stoljar 2015). Yet, in the case of the mental, there is little
indication that we know enough about what a future account of the mental
would look like to offer a sufficiently rich characterization of the mental.
A lack of access to theories of the mental would only exacerbate this problem.
In the end, the real impetus behind this objection would seem to be
a conviction that our current understanding of the mental is rich enough to
do the relevant philosophical work. We have already provided reasons to
think that it is not. Whether or not one is convinced by our arguments on
this front, it is clear that simply avoiding theories of the mental does not
circumvent the dilemma.
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5.5. Objection #5
Even if theories of the mental are relevant, most of our current theories
are not about the mental itself but rather the metaphysical status of the
mental with respect to the physical. 21 In other words, our so-called theories
of the mental are not theories about mental phenomena the way that physical theories are about physical phenomena. Because of this, the dilemma
fails to emerge in the first place.
Reply: We have two responses to offer. First, while we acknowledge that
there are theories of the mental that focus primarily on answering questions
concerning the relationship of the mental to the physical, it is clear that
not all of them are content to do only that. For instance, both proponents
of naturalistic dualism (Chalmers 1996) and panpsychism (see various essays in Seager 2020) have sought to offer substantive, positive accounts of
the mental.
Second, even if we were to grant that most theories of the mental are
primarily interested in investigating the relationship of the mental to the
physical, we maintain that it is difficult to answer these questions without
answering fundamental questions about the nature of mental phenomena
themselves. In order to see why this is the case, we need to consider the
two horns of our dilemma.
Let’s begin with the first horn of the dilemma. In our discussion, we
highlighted the disagreement that exists with regard to fundamental questions concerning the nature of qualia. These questions were not limited to
the relationship of qualia to the physical. Instead, they often concern important details about qualia themselves, addressing such issues as whether
they exist at all, how they are introspectively revealed to us, whether they
are simple or complex, what experiential modalities give rise to them, and
what sort of creatures experience them. What is important to note isn’t
merely the existence of this disagreement, but also the fact that the manner in which we might resolve these theoretical disagreements has clear
We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possible objection. As
they succinctly put it, theories of the mental “are not about the mental the way that
fluid mechanics is about fluids, they are about the relationship between the mental
and the physical.”
21
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implications regarding the metaphysical status of the mental and its relationship to the physical. After all, much of the recent debate regarding the
metaphysics of consciousness seems to turn on whether the nature of qualia
is somehow revealed to us through introspection. 22
Now consider the second horn of the dilemma. In outlining the problems
with futurism, we did note that positions such as dualism, neutral monism,
and panpsychism promise to be transformative. We also suggested that it
would be hard to offer substantial versions of these positions without making significant claims about the nature of mental phenomena in and of
themselves, but here we don’t need this claim to defeat the objection. If the
objector is right that contemporary theories of the mental merely address
its relationship to the physical, then such theories would provide no help at
all to futurism. They wouldn’t even address the issues raised in the context
of currentism.

6. Conclusion
In this essay we have argued that our understanding of the mental faces
a similar (but not completely analogous) dilemma to the one facing our
understanding of the physical. Our defense of this involved three steps.
First, we outlined the reasons why this dilemma may have been overlooked
or quickly dismissed. We argued that these reasons are insufficient and provided initial motivation for thinking that the dilemma might obtain. Second, we demonstrated that both horns of the dilemma are problematic:
currentism with respect to mental is likely to be at least incomplete or
inadequate, and futurism remains indeterminate. Third, we defended the
dilemma against several deflationary objections. If we are right, then philosophers interested in metaphysical questions surrounding the mental need
to take our dilemma into account.

See, e.g., Balog (2012); Chalmers (2007); Diaz-Leon (2014); Elpidorou (2015)
and (2016); Goff (2011); Hill & McLaughlin (1999); Levin (2007); Levine (2007);
Loar (1997); Nida-Rümelin (2006); Papineau (2002) and (2007); Schroer (2010),
Stoljar (2005); Sturgeon (1994); Sundström (2011); Trogdon (2016).
22
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It is instructive to compare our position to Stoljar’s (2006) epistemic
view on consciousness, namely, the view according to which the reason why
consciousness appears to be other than physical is because we are ignorant
of some non-experiential but experience-relevant truths. Unlike Stoljar we
do not use our current ignorance about the nature of qualia or consciousness
as a way to disarm traditional anti-physicalist objections. Nor do we insist
that our ignorance is due to an elusive set of non-experiential but experience-relevant truths. To hold that the only truths about consciousness that
escape us are non-experiential is to accept that our present understanding
of (phenomenal) consciousness is more or less complete. DaM denies this
assumption. Thus, if we are correct to insist that DaM is a problem, then
our ignorance is larger than it is commonly assumed. The bad news is that
we do not know as much as we think we do. The good news is that such an
admission of ignorance opens up the possibility for new and exciting prospects on mentality in general and on consciousness in particular. A more
complete understanding of the mental could render some of the pesky epistemic arguments against physicalism pseudo-problems. Or it could conversely show that physicalism is an unattainable position. So, while DaM
may not resolve traditional philosophical puzzles, it may succeed in transforming them. At the very least, it is a call to action to seek a more philosophically and empirically robust account of the mental.
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